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Abstract 
We investigate the effect of the decline in trade costs on trade, terms of trade and welfare of Europe 
(the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) and three large exporters (India, Indonesia and the United 
States) during the first globalization using a ‘bottom-up’ approach. We measure total route and product 
specific trade costs for a representative sample of commodities with price gaps predicted by observed 
trade costs. We use a simple microeconomic model and we buttress our findings with additional 
econometric testing. We find that price convergence accounted for almost all the improvement in terms 
of trade of producing countries and increased significantly welfare in both producing and especially 
consuming countries, while its positive effect on bilateral trade was often swamped by other factors. 
The findings caution against the substation of proxies to actual measures of trade costs. 
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1) Introduction 
  International trade theory holds that trade costs are key determinants of 
trade and welfare (Donaldson 2015: 621-623). However, actual trade costs 
are difficult to estimate and thus in empirical work they have often been 
substituted by distance, as a proxy of transportation costs, together with 
dummies for borders and other relevant effects. The results have been 
somewhat puzzling, as shown by the persistence of the distance coefficients 
surveyed by Disdier and Head (2008). Recent advances in modelling within 
the gravity framework have led to the development of new measures of 
aggregate trade costs (Head and Mayer 2014, Meissner 2014), but the results 
are not robust to small changes in sampling and parameters (Jacks et al. 
2011, Hugot 2015). Furthermore, as Hillberry and Hummels (2013) point out, 
this approach neglects the effect of changes in factor endowment and 
technological or demand shocks on trade flows. 
We complement this ‘top-down’ approach with a ‘bottom-up’ strategy. We 
measure the effects of changes in the costs of exporting a representative 
sample of primary products from India, Indonesia and the United States to 
Europe on bilateral trade, terms of trade and welfare during the first 
globalization, from Waterloo to World War One (Federico and Tena 2016a). In 
a companion paper (Chilosi and Federico 2015), we measure changes in 
different types of trade costs and their effect on price differentials. Thus, in 
this paper we can rely on product and route-specific trade costs, rather than 
on aggregate estimates based on selected price differentials only, as is the 
standard practice in microeconomic studies (cf. e.g. O’Rourke and Williamson 
1994, Keller and Shiue 2008, Simonovska and Waugh 2014a, Donaldson 
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forthcoming). Only data on primary products are available, but commodities 
accounted for about 60 per cent of world trade in those years (Lewis 1981) 
and there is a silver lining: the analysis is simpler as primary products are 
more homogeneous than manufactures. 
Our micro-economic approach contributes to the literature on trade with 
estimates of the different impacts of bilateral trade costs, in comparison to 
those of multilateral resistance terms and non-cost related factors, on bilateral 
flows by country/product: the standard frameworks can distinguish them only 
imperfectly (for countries) or not at all (for products). Similarly, our estimates 
of the welfare effects complement the macroeconomic measures of total gains 
from trade (Arkolakis et al. 2012, Costinot and Rodriguez-Claire 2014, 
Felbermayr et al. 2015). These latter refer to all gains relative to autarchy (i.e. 
infinite trading costs), including welfare benefits from more variety. In contrast, 
our estimate deals with the effect of moving between different levels of trade 
costs. 
Our work also contributes to the historical literature on market integration 
during the first globalization. Most of this literature deals with trends in price 
convergence and their causes. These works have not so far been directly 
related to those on trade and, generally, the effects of integration have been 
relatively little studied (cf. Lampe and Sharp 2016). Their analysis has 
focused on changes in factor income and their political consequences 
(O’Rourke and Williamson 1999). Only two papers (Ejrnæs and Persson 2010 
and Steinwender 2014) estimate the welfare gains from integration. Moreover, 
both of them examine only the short-run impact of the lay-out of transatlantic 
telegraph lines on efficiency, of the wheat and cotton markets, respectively. 
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Last but not least, by quantifying the effects of price convergence on terms of 
trade, we address a gap in the debate on the negative effects of market 
integration on prospects for growth in the Third World (Williamson 2011). 
Our baseline analytical tool is a partial-equilibrium model which allocates 
changes in trade costs between price increases in producing countries and 
price decreases in consumer ones. This approach is the only viable strategy 
for a microeconomic model in the absence of complete information on trade 
costs and flows for all pairs of trading partners. We also double-check the 
results with a range of econometric testing techniques from international 
economics. 
In the next section we present some background information about trends in 
market integration, trade costs, exports and terms of trade for the three 
exporting countries we consider. We describe the model in Section Three and 
in Section Four we use it to estimate changes in prices in producing and 
consuming countries. We deal with the effects of market integration on terms 
of trade in Section Five, and on the effects on bilateral trade, a bridge 
between the two literatures, in Section Six. In Section Seven, we estimate the 
aggregate welfare benefits and we discuss briefly how they were distributed 
among regions and social groups. Section Eight concludes. 
 
2) Market integration, trade costs and the growth of trade: an overview 
  Our companion paper (Chilosi and Federico 2015) considers 22 products, 
but we have to drop eight of them from the present analysis as some data are 
lacking (cf. the list in Table 3). As Table 1 shows, the goods considered here 
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accounted for quite high shares of exports, but for the United States after 
1870. 
[Table 1 here] 
Chilosi and Federico (2015) find that across products price convergence was 
faster before than after 1870, but the causes differed between periods and 
countries. Before 1870, convergence was mainly determined by the abolition 
of barriers to trade – the British Corn Laws for American exports of wheat and 
the monopolies of the British East India Company in 1815 and of the Dutch 
trading company in the 1850s. Since 1870, trade was liberalized and further 
convergence reflects improvements in transportation, with the spread of 
steam-ships, and communication, thanks to the lay-out of telegraphic cables. 
The falls in price gaps for a selected group of commodities are illustrated by 
Figure 1, together with the lines fitted by panel regressions predicting price 
gaps from different types of trade costs, such as shipping freights and duties, 
across routes (Chilosi and Federico 2015: Table 6).1 These fitted values are 
here interpreted as ‘iceberg’ trade costs and as detailed in the next section we 
use them to measure specific trade costs. The lines show huge differences 
among products in initial level and the time profile of convergence. In fact, 
trade costs depended on the size of product-specific barriers to trade, on the 
price of the product and also on its volume per unit of weight, which 
determined the unit transport costs (Thomas 1930: 230). 
                                                          
1
 Instrumental variable estimation addresses potential endogeneity of duty and freight factors. 
The trading monopolies increased price gaps almost entirely through their effect on freight 
rates. The panels explain three-quarters or more of the variation in price gaps, across trade 
routes (cf. Chilosi and Federico 2015 for details). 
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[Figure 1 here] 
 
The data from our countries are consistent with a ‘terms of trade boom’ for 
primary producers (Williamson 2011): on the eve of World War One, the terms 
of trade were 50 per cent higher in India and a third higher in the United 
States than in 1815 and 40 per cent higher in Indonesia than in the mid-
1820s.2 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
However, as Figure 2 shows, each country had its own different medium-term 
trends. All the improvement in the Indian terms of trade was cumulated since 
the 1870s while (almost) the opposite is true for the United States, where two 
thirds of the improvements happened before the Civil War. The series for 
Indonesia shows a twin peak, in the late 1870s and in the early 1890s, when 
they were more than double the initial level and almost two and half times 
higher than in the 1820s (and 53 per cent than in 1913). These differences 
suggest that movements in terms of trade crucially depended on country-
specific factors. 
                                                          
2 All these figures are computed on the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered series, using the 
beginning of the series (1800 for United States and India, 1823 for Indonesia) as reference 
year. Here and subsequently 6.25 is used as smoothing parameter, as recommended for 
yearly data. 
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The period of price convergence coincided with a fast increase in world trade 
and openness (Federico and Tena 2016a, 2016b). The USA, India and 
Indonesia shared this trend, although with some differences (Figure 3). 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
The Unites States’ share of world trade at current prices almost doubled, 
while those of the two Asian countries fluctuated a lot (Table 2). India 
succeeded to increase its share up to almost 7 per cent in the late 1880s, but 
then it experience a steep fall to below 4 per cent in the wake of the collapse 
of exports of wheat and the stagnation of those of jute and cotton cloths 
(Chaudhuri 1982). Total Indian exports did recover and on the eve of World 
War One they were about a tenth higher than in the 1880s, but the share 
never approached the pre-crisis peak. Indonesia’s share more than doubled in 
the 1830s, when peasants were forced to provide growing quantities of coffee, 
sugar and spices under the Cultivation System (van Zanden and Marks 2012). 
It peaked at around 1.8 per cent in the early 1840s, but declined in the 1850s 
and 1860s and fluctuated around 1 per cent until the war. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Europe as a whole absorbed over three quarters of American exports (and the 
United Kingdom about a half) until the turn of the century, declining to two 
thirds (and a quarter) on the eve of World War One (Historical Statistics 2006: 
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series Ee 533, 540 and 541). Exports to Europe accounted for about half of 
Indian exports throughout the century, but the British share fell from 45 per 
cent to 25 per cent (Chaudhuri 1982: 862, 864). Similarly, in the early 
nineteenth century about half of Indonesia’s exports were to Europe and this 
proportion was only slightly lower at the end of our period, but the Dutch share 
fell from 50 to 30 per cent (Korthals Altes 1991: 93-102). 
3) The model 
The model considers the interaction between a producing country (subscript 
P) and a consuming one (C). We assume linear demand and supply functions 
with demand (DP and DC) and supply (SP and SC) depending on price only, PP 
in the producing country and PC in the consuming country – i.e.: 
DC=a+αPC                 1) 
SC=b+γCPC                       2) 
DP=c+βPP                     3) 
SP=d+γPPP                     4) 
Where α<0, β<0, γC>0 and γP>0. The price differential between the two 
countries, in efficient trading markets, is equal to trade costs t (Federico 
2012a).3 Thus, we substitute PC=PP+t and simplify the notation by writing 
                                                          
3
 We prefer this additive notation to the standard ‘iceberg’ assumption (i.e. PC=tPP) because 
we deem the assumption of strict proportionality of transaction costs to prices highly 
unrealistic. It surely does not hold true for specific duties as the British Corn Laws. 
Nevertheless, it is straightforward to adapt the model (cf. Online Appendix B) and using the 
‘iceberg’ assumption yields almost identical results. 
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PP=P and omitting the constants, which do not affect the comparative statics. 
The market clears when the total demand equals the total supply: 
γPP+γC(P+t)=α(P+t)+βP 
or: 
γPP+γCP-αP-βP=αt-γPt 
Re-arranging yields an expression for the effect of changes in trade costs on 
prices in the producing country: 
dP=[(α-γC)/(γP+γC-α-β)]dt    5) 
While the parallel condition for the change in prices in the consuming country 
is:  
d(P+t)/dt=dP/dt+1 
d(P+t)=[(γP-β)/(γP+γC-α-β)]dt           6) 
We express the unknown coefficients α, β and γ in terms of elasticities of 
demand (ηC and ηP) and supply (εC and εP). To this aim, we select the units of 
measurement so that in the baseline year P=1 and SP=1. Furthermore, we 
express consumption in the producing country and supply in the consuming 
country as proportions x and z of production in the producing country 
(DP=xSP=x and SC=zSP=z). Of course, for tropical products (including cotton) 
SC=z=0. In this notation, the demand in the consuming country is equal to 
imports from the producer (XP) plus local supply DC=XP+SC=SP-DP+SC=(1-
x+z). Substituting in the standard definition of elasticity and re-arranging, we 
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obtain α=ηC[(1-x+z)/(1+t)], β=ηP*x, γC=εC [z/(1+t)] and γP=εP. We thus can re-
write 5) and 6) as functions of the elasticities and of the parameters x, t and z: 
dP=[(ηC*(1-x+z)/(1+t)- z*εC/(1+t))]/ [(εP+ z*εC /(1+t) – ηC *(1-x+z)/(1+t)- ηP*x)]dt  
7) 
d(P+t) =(εP-ηP*x)/[(εP+z*εC/(1+t)-ηC*(1-x+z)/(1+t)-ηP*x)]dt           8) 
These two formulae allow us to estimate how changes in trade costs are 
allocated and thus affect prices in exporting and importing countries. We can 
also estimate the effects of the changes in trade costs on trade (dXP) as the 
difference between changes in demand (dDC) and supply (dSC) in the 
importing country: 
dXP=αd(P+t)-γEd(P+t)=[ηE(1-x+z)/(1+t)-z*εC/(1+t)]*[(εC-ηP*x)/[(εP+z*εC/(1+t)-
ηC(1-x+z)/(1+t)-ηP*x)]]dt     9) 
Note that, given η<0 and ε>0, the first term in the numerator is negative, the 
second is positive and the denominator is positive: a decline in trade costs 
(dt<0) causes trade to rise.  
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
We estimate the effect of price convergence on welfare as the differences 
between changes in producers’ and consumers’ surpluses (Figure 3). 
Following Hufbauer et al. (2002), we assume costs to remain positive rather 
than becoming nil as in the standard partial-equilibrium analysis of trade 
liberalization (the Haberger triangles). 
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A fall in trade costs implies that in the producing country (Figure 3) the price of 
the exported good rises by dPP causing demand to fall by –dDP, domestic 
supply to rise by dSP and exports to increase by dXP. The consumer surplus 
decreases by YBAZ, the producers’ surplus increases by YCDZ – so that net 
gains are equivalent to the area of the trapezoid ABCD. The area can be 
decomposed in two triangles ABF and CED, which measure the reaction of 
consumers and producers to change in prices, and in a rectangle BCEF, 
which measures the benefits for producers from the increased prices. The 
respective areas can be measured as: 
a) rectangle  BCEF: DWGi=dPP*(SP-DP) 
b) triangle ABF: DWGii=-0.5*dPP*dDP=-0.5*dPP
2*ηP*DP/PP 
c) triangle CED: DWGiii=0.5*dPP*dSP=0.5*dPP
2*εP*SP/PP                         10) 
The total gains are obtained as a sum of the three: 
DWGE=DWi+DWGii+DWGiii= dPP*(SP-DP) -
0.5*dPP
2*ηP*DP/PP+0.5*dPP
2*εP*SP/PP 11) 
Multiplying by PP/PP, dividing by GNPP and re-arranging yields: 
DWGP/GNPP= dPP/PP*[(SP-DP)*PP/GNPP]-0.5*(dPP/PP)
2*(ηP*DP*PP/GNPP-
εP*SP* PP/GNPP)    12) 
Defining δP= (DP* PP)/GNPP and θP= (SP* PP)/GNPP as the ratio of total 
consumption and production on GNPP yields the final formula: 
DWGA/GNPA = dPP/PP*(θP-δP)-0.5*(dPP/PP)
2*[ηP* δP- εP*θP] 13) 
The second term is positive by definition as ηP<0 and εP>0.  The first term is 
positive for net exporters, too, because market integration causes prices to 
rise (dPP/PP) and production exceeds consumption (θP-δP>0). Note that gains 
can be substantial for minor products if all production is exported (i.e. if θP and 
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δP  are both very low) and for products mostly consumed at home (high δP), if 
the surplus is large enough. 
The reasoning is symmetric for the importing country, yielding:  
DWGC/GNPC=-dPC/PC*(δC- θC)+0.5*(dPC/PC)
2*[εC*θC- ηC* δC] 14) 
The gains are positive in net importing countries because integration causes 
prices to fall (dPC/PC <0) and consumption exceeds production (δC- θC>0). 
Summing up, we obtain expressions to estimate the changes in prices for 
producers (7) and for consumers (8) and consequently the changes in trade 
(9) and welfare (13 and 14) for each product given changes in price gaps (dt). 
They need only eight parameters: the elasticities of supply and demand in 
producing and consuming countries, the ratios of production in the consuming 
country and consumption in the producing country to production in the 
producing country, and the shares of production and consumption on GDP in 
a baseline year.  
 
4) Trade costs and change in prices  
As mentioned before the fitted price gaps from Chilosi and Federico (2015) 
(cf. Figure 1) correspond to ‘iceberg’ trade costs. We transform them into 
series of specific trade costs in two steps. First, we transform these ratios into 
nominal specific (i.e. per unit of weight) trade costs by taking the average of 
the specific cost implied by the expected (HP-filtered) import and export 
prices. Second, we deflate the nominal values with the export price index of 
the producing country. 
We use our model to allocate changes in these trade costs (dt) on prices in 
producing (dPP) and consuming countries (dPC). We normalize all data to 
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export prices of 1913, as data for that year are much more abundant than for 
previous ones (for sources for data on production and consumption and a 
discussion of the choice of the elasticities see the Online Appendix C). We 
double-check the results with an econometric test inspired by the literature on 
the pass-through of tariffs (e.g. Feenstra 1995; Marchand 2012; Nicita 2009). 
Specifically, we run the regression: 
ln(pijt)=αi-Producer*θp,iln(τit)+Consumer*θc,i*ln(τit)+uijt 15) 
Where pijt is the nominal price of the product i (e.g. Indian cotton) in place j at 
time t, the constant αi estimates the natural logarithm of the nominal world 
price of that product,4 Producer and Consumer are indicator dummies and τit 
are product and route-specific nominal trade costs. We interpret unit elasticity 
as perfect pass through and thus we constrain the sum of the shares of 
changes obtained by the producer (θp,i) and by the consumer (θc,i) to one. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 reports the results separately since the first year of the series, which 
differs between goods (‘earliest to 1913’) or since 1870 (‘1870 to 1913’). Note 
that the counterfactual of the model is an increase in price gaps, but we invert 
the signs to facilitate the interpretation and comparison with the results of the 
                                                          
4
 The assumption that this price is constant is strong, but all the parameters have the 
expected signs and expected sizes, and clustered standard errors by product imply that the 
shares estimated by the regression analysis are all significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Including linear time trends does not improve the results and there are not enough degrees of 
freedom to precisely estimate non-linear trends with time dummies. 
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regression. Estimates from the model and the regression are reassuringly 
similar: the unweighted averages are very similar and the coefficients of 
correlation are 0.92 (‘earliest to 1913’) and 0.85 (‘1870 to 1913’). They differ in 
the allocation of whether producers or consumers saw more substantial price 
changes in four cases out of fourteen: cotton and linseed from India and sugar 
and tin from Indonesia. However, in two of them the absolute change in trade 
costs is very small. The difference is large only for sugar from Indonesia. 
There a visual inspection of the series suggests that most gains accrued to 
consumers, as implied by the regression (cf. Online Appendix A). 
The message is clear: consumers fared better than producers. Only Indian tea 
growers and Indonesian coffee-growers received surely most of the gains 
from price convergence. As just said, in four other cases, results differ 
according to the method of estimation. Consumers got more in the remaining 
eight: indigo, jute, rapeseed, rice and wheat from India, wheat and cotton from 
the United States and rice for Indonesia. This latter case, however, needs 
some additional information. In fact, since the 1870s Indonesia started to 
import rice from India because local farmers were unable to meet the 
domestic demand for low-quality rice (van der Eng 1997: 182-183). According 
to the model, the 30 per cent fall in trade costs caused price of Indian rice in 
Batavia to decline by 25 per cent, while prices of local high quality rice 
increased by 2 per cent. This widening gap is obviously consistent with 
increasing imports.5 
                                                          
5
 Reassuringly, both estimates imply that the fall in trade costs augmented prices in India by 
about 5 per cent.  
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Why did European consumers on average gain more than producers? We 
explore the issue by re-computing dPP and dPC under alternative assumptions 
about four key parameters: i) net export from producing countries equal to 
zero (x=1); ii) no alternative source of commodities for Europe (z=0); iii) 
inelastic European demand (ηP=0); iv) inelastic supply of European (or 
alternative) producers (εC=0). The results of latter hypothesis are the most 
similar to the baseline case.6 This suggests that the outward shift in Asian 
supply caused by the decline in trade costs was not compensated by a 
parallel decrease in supply from other competitors. This interpretation is 
consistent with the results of the analysis of the export performance of Asian 
countries (Federico and Tena 2016c). The supply of manufactures was in all 
likelihood rather elastic and thus we speculate that exporters of industrial 
goods were more likely to gain from convergence than primary producers. 
 
5) The effects of price convergence on the terms of trade 
  We estimate the contribution of market integration to changes in the terms of 
trade by comparing the actual movements with counterfactual, no integration 
ones. We compute these latter with a ‘synthetic’ export price index, which 
covers only the goods available in our data-base.7 The contribution of price 
                                                          
6
 In all four cases, by construction, the predicted differences between the European and Asian 
shares are greater than in the baseline case. The average difference in case iv) is 11.5 per 
cent, as compared to 37.3 per cent, 35.3 per cent, and 50.4 per cent, respectively, under the 
first three alternative hypotheses.  
7
  We build the ‘synthetic’ index for the United States as a Fisher index for wheat and cotton, 
while for India and Indonesia we estimate two different price indexes for the periods 1849-
1870 and 1871-1913, so as to maximize coverage. The (Fisher) indexes for Indonesia include 
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convergence of our products to the change in terms of trade (CT) can be 
written as: 
CT=C1*C2*C3  16) 
Where C1=Δexport price index/(Δexport price index-Δimport price index) is 
the contribution of the absolute change in export prices to the change in terms 
of trade, C2= Δsynthetic export price index/Δexport price index is the 
contribution of the change in the ’synthetic’ index to the overall change in 
export prices and C3=1-Δsynthetic export price index/Δcounterfactual 
synthetic export price index is the contribution of market integration to the 
change in the synthetic price index, and the operator Δ refers to total 
changes.  
As a first step, we compute the contribution of actual convergence for the 
products of the synthetic index to the total improvement in terms of trade – i.e. 
the two first terms of eq. 16). We consider the period 1849-1913 for all 
countries for the sake of comparability across countries (the Indonesia series 
starts only in that year) and for Indonesia only the period 1849-1894, to 
explore the causes of the boom in the terms of trade (Figure 2). 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The results (Table 4) suggest two main points. First, the import side either 
mattered very little or even had a negative impact on terms of trade – i.e. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
coffee, pepper, sugar and rice in 1849-1870 and coffee, pepper, sugar, rice and tin in 1871-
1913. For India, we compute a Laspeyres index for 1849-1870 including only jute, indigo, 
linseed and rapeseed (using linseed as a proxy) and a Fisher one for 1871-1913, adding 
cotton, wheat and rice. 
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nominal import prices were rising rather than declining (although of course 
real prices might have declined). Indeed globalization forces were not as 
strong as on the export side. There was no massive liberalization of imports in 
producing countries, as duties on imports were low and constant in India and 
Indonesia, high and fluctuating in the United States (Federico and Vasta 
2015). It is also likely that the decline in transportation costs affected imports 
much less than exports because imports consisted mostly in manufactures, 
which had a low freight factor since the beginning. Second, trends in the 
synthetic price index reproduce fairly well the movements in total export prices 
for India and the USA. For Indonesia, they over-predict changes in total prices 
in the long run, but they under-predict the changes before 1894. The bottom 
line of Table 4 shows that the increase in export prices of the covered 
commodities more than account for the whole improvement in terms of trade 
of the three producing countries in the long run. How much of this increase 
was accounted for by market integration? 
We obtain a counterfactual, no-integration, index of prices comparable to the 
‘synthetic’ one in three steps. First, we estimate counterfactual price ratios, 
hypothesizing that the monopolies of the Western trading companies on Asian 
trade had not been abolished, that telegraphic connections had not been 
established, and that duties and transport costs had remained constant at 
their initial level, and using the long-run elasticities estimated by the route-
specific regressions presented in Chilosi and Federico (2015: Table 6). Then, 
we extract the corresponding prices in producing countries using the split 
predicted by the model (Table 3) and finally we compute the counterfactual 
synthetic export price index. 
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We check the robustness of results with two alternative econometric 
strategies. First, we estimate the elasticity of the export price index with 
respect to the price ratios by running the regression: 
ln(PEit)=αi+Σβikln(PRikt)+δiln(PTt)+uit+λui,t -1 17) 
Where PEit is the synthetic export price index in country i at time t, PRikt is the 
price ratio between export and import prices for the k-th good and PTt is a 
generic price index. We use for India and Indonesia an index of prices of 
tropical products in London (Federico and Tena 2016c) and for the USA a 
simple time trend, adding also a dummy for the civil war. Then, we compute 
the counterfactual price index as: 
PECFit
2=Exp[ln(PEit)+Σβikln(PRik0-PRikt)] 18) 
Our third approach addresses the possible imprecision in estimating the 
elasticities β from the neglect of changes in weights of the actual price index.8 
The specification is:  
ln(PEit)=αi+βiln(MIit)+δiln(PTt)+uit+λui,t -1  19) 
Where MI is a polity-specific index of market integration, which replicates the 
methodology used to compute the synthetic export price index, replacing 
prices with price ratios. We then compute the counterfactual price index as: 
PECFit
3=Exp[ln(PEit)+βiln(MIi0- MIit)] 20) 
 We report the contribution of price convergence to changes in the synthetic 
price index and to the terms of trade in Table 5. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
                                                          
8
 Overall, 90 per cent of these elasticities have the expected sign, but only half of them are 
significant at the 5 per cent level. 
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Counterfactual 2 is higher than the other two, but the differences are not so 
large to force a different interpretation. The upper part of the table shows that 
price convergence accounted for most change in the synthetic export price 
index in India and Indonesia (almost all for the period before 1894) and about 
half of it in the USA. As seen before (Table 1), the products we consider are 
representative of trends in export prices, which, in turn, account for all the 
long-run improvement in terms of trade. A simple average of the implicit 
contribution according to the three counterfactuals (Table 5, lower part) 
suggests that price convergence of our products explains all the long-term 
increase in terms of trade for India and Indonesia and about a half for the 
United States. It caused terms of trade to improve by 120 per cent in India, by 
47 per cent in Indonesia (by 62 per cent for the period 1849-1894) and by 5 
per cent in the United States, vs. actual increases by 108 per cent, 52 per 
cent and 14 per cent in the same years. 
 
6) The effects of price convergence on trade  
  We estimate the effects of price convergence on bilateral trade by product 
according to eq. 9) and we report the results in Table 6, normalizing to exports 
in 1913. As in Table 4, we consider separately the longest period possible for 
each product (‘earliest to 1913’) and the period 1870-1913 (‘1870 to 1913’). 
Clearly, our model does not predict well changes in bilateral trade flows. For 
instance, it predicts an increase of Indian cotton exports to the United 
Kingdom from 1870 to 1913 equivalent to 6.7 times the exports in 1913, while 
actual exports declined by 4.9 times, or by 83 per cent of their 1870 level. 
19 
 
19 
 
These divergences are not really surprising. Our estimate measures only the 
effect of changes in trade costs, ignoring all other factors which can affect 
trade. The list includes i) changes in total demand of the product in consuming 
and/or producing countries as consequence of technological change, increase 
in GDP per capita and population growth; ii) changes in trade costs between 
the consuming country and other suppliers of the good or between the 
producer and other consumers; iii) changes in supply conditions in the 
consumer country (e.g. wheat), in the exporting country or in any other 
competitor, as a consequence of changes in factor endowment and/or 
technology. 
 We measure these effects by running a panel regression (Head and Mayer 
2014: 151). 
ln(qit)=αi+βi1year+β2ln(τit)+ βi3Dit+uit 21)   
Where αi are flow-specific fixed effects, year are flow-specific trends aimed at 
capturing changes in the multilateral resistance factors (Anderson and von 
Wincoop 2004), τit are our series of (flow-specific and iceberg) trade costs, Dit 
are dummies for relevant events, namely the American Civil War for American 
cotton and wheat and the introduction of synthetic dyes for indigo (since 
1898).9 We address potential endogeneity of transport costs by instrumenting 
                                                          
9
 Using a negative binomial regression yields a slightly lower β2  coefficient, while the estimate 
of trade elasticity from a IV model with all series is about 40 per cent lower.  We have 
experimented adding the available series of product-specific trade costs but the results have 
been disappointing: these other series have an opposite expected sign but are highly collinear 
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them as in Chilosi and Federico (2015).10 Some products are missing 
because of our choice to start in 1848, itself as a compromise between the 
need to have a balanced sample to reduce the sample selection bias from 
missing trade data (Verbeek and Nijman 1992; Baltagi et al. 2014) and the 
need to extend our coverage back in time as much as possible to capture the 
effects of early globalization on trade. 
Seven out of the eight fixed effects and product-specific trends are significant 
and all but two significant trends are positive (i.e. other factors increased 
bilateral trade, ceteris paribus). The trade elasticity (β2) is negative and 
significant at the 1 per cent level. The coefficient (-1.81) is low, as the 
conventional wisdom suggests figure well in excess of -3 (Caliendo and Parro 
2015; Head and Mayer 2014; Hilberry and Hummels 2013; Hugot 2015; 
Simonovska and Waugh 2014a, 2014b). Head and Mayer (2014) point out 
that naïve gravity models yield similarly low coefficients because they omit 
multilateral resistance effects but we control for these factors, albeit 
imperfectly. Therefore, we speculate that the difference reflects the nature of 
our data. With a fixed sample of goods, we can capture the intensive margin 
but we miss the extensive margin and possibly changes in mark-ups due to 
monopolistic competition (Simonovska and Waugh 2014b). Indeed, our 
                                                                                                                                                                      
with the flow-specific ones. Likewise, omitting trends or adding GDP of origin and destinations 
worsens the results.  
10
 Our instrument is a new series where we use the trend component of a HP decomposition 
of the freight factors to fit price gaps instead of the actual freight factors so as to eliminate the 
effect of potentially endogenous short-term fluctuations. 
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aggregate elasticity is consistent with product-specific parameters from Ossa 
(2015).11 
We predict total change in bilateral trade as: 
Δqi= exp[αi+βi1*1913+β2ln(τi,1913)+ βi3Di,1913]- exp[αi+βi1yearo+β2ln(τi,t0)+ βi3Di,t0]     22) 
And the effect of changes in trade costs, ceteris paribus, as: 
Δqτ= exp[αi+βi1yearo+β2ln(τi,1913)+ βi3Di,t0]- exp[αi+βi1yearo+β2ln(τi,t0)+ βi3Di,t0]  
23) 
The regression predicts fairly well the total change in trade in 1870-1913: the 
root mean square error (RMSE) is less than a quarter of the root mean square 
change. This ratio increases to 75 per cent over the whole period (‘earliest to 
1870’) because of large divergences in the series of Indian indigo and 
Indonesian coffee. In contrast, the regression, as the model, does a poor job 
at predicting actual bilateral flows from changes in trade costs only, with 
RMSE over root mean square change ratios of over 200 per cent in the long 
run. In fact, the prediction errors are very similar between the two methods: 
the RMSE for the same set of products is higher for the regression in the long 
run and only slightly lower for the shorter period 1870-1913.12 
Both approaches fail to capture the collapse in exports of indigo from India 
and coffee from Indonesia, which can be explained by specific circumstances. 
Indian exports of indigo were wiped out by the commercial development of 
                                                          
11
 The trade elasticities in 2007 are 1.01 for cotton, 1.7 sugar, 1.83 metallic ores, 2.13 
oilseeds, 2.43 rice, 3 wheat and 3.19 coffee 
12
 At the level of the product significant differences in the predictions are expected when the 
assumption of homogenous trade elasticity underlying the regression is violated (cf. Costinot 
and Rodriguez-Claire 2014: 242, Hilberry and Hummels 2013). 
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synthetic dyes in the 1890s, as shown by the fairly accurate prediction from 
the full regression, which, as said, includes a specific dummy for the event.13 
The fall in exports of Java coffee to the Netherlands must be framed in a 
general change in specialization of Indonesia. Coffee accounted for almost 
half of its exports in the early 1830s, for 40 per cent forty years later (and Java 
for a fifth of world trade) and for only 5 per cent on the eve of World War One. 
Total exports halved from the early 1870s to 1913, below the level of the early 
1830s. The other cases of decline in bilateral trade flows can be explained 
with specific circumstances, too. Exports of Indian cotton to the United 
Kingdom were exceptionally high in the 1860s but then declined when the 
(qualitatively superior) American cotton returned to the British market and 
India re-oriented its exports towards Japan and other European countries. A 
similar dynamic explains the decline of Indian rice exports to the UK: the 
British share collapsed in the 1880s and continued to decline thereafter, at the 
same time as the shares grew for Asian countries like Indonesia and Japan 
and European ones such as Germany and the Netherlands (Statistical 
Abstract of British India, various issues). 
Last but not least, by definition, as already mentioned, a product-specific 
approach cannot capture the effect of the decline in trade costs on the range 
of traded goods. This fact can explain the differences with the result by 
Estevadeordal et al. (2003: Table III) and Jacks et al. (2011: Table 5), who 
                                                          
13
In the period 1870-1913 prices gaps for indigo were essentially trendless. Our preferred 
measure of trade costs detects a slight fall, but the iceberg trade costs detect a slight 
increase. 
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estimate that decline of trade costs explain respectively a third and half of the 
growth of world trade from 1870 to 1913.  
 
7) The effects of price convergence on welfare  
  We estimate the welfare gains of price convergence for producers and 
consumers (here represented by the United Kingdom for simplicity), assuming 
that our estimates of price changes extend to all production or consumption of 
each commodity (i.e. that the market was not segmented by quality). We 
calibrate the model to 1913 and estimate the effects of a return of prices at 
their level at the beginning of the series (‘earliest to 1913’) or to their 1870 
level (’1870 to 1913’), using both estimates of price changes from Table 3. We 
report gains by product in Table A9 in the Online Appendix, and in Table 7 we 
group them by major categories. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
The overall differences between the two estimates are quite modest, with 
some exceptions, most notably for Indonesia. Both methods, consistent with 
the results of the convergence analysis (Chilosi and Federico 2015), yield 
greater gains in the whole period (column ‘earliest to 1913’). Actually, the data 
understate the difference with the short run (column ‘1870 to 1913’) gains for 
the United Kingdom and India because these latter include three additional 
products. The short-run gains for the same set of goods are equivalent to 0.46 
per cent of British and 0.83 per cent of Indian GDP according to the model (or 
0.49 per cent and 0.61 per cent according to the regression). 
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The British consumers benefitted more than producers because they obtained 
most of the decline in trade costs (Section 3). Most of their gains come from 
wheat in the earliest period and this suggests an important role for the 
abolition of the Corn Laws. Although these latter were uniquely British, most 
European countries liberalized wheat imports in the mid-19th century 
(Federico 2012b), in all likelihood with substantial gains for their consumers. 
Our estimate of British gains from the integration of the cotton market in the 
long run is almost as large, because cotton industry was very important in the 
United Kingdom and used only imported raw material. However, part of these 
gains did not accrue to British consumers and were transferred back to 
purchasers of British cotton goods, including Indian ones. 
The outcome of integration for the three producers was widely different, 
reflecting the share of net exports on GDP. Thus, United States gained little, 
because in 1913 wheat and cotton jointly accounted for only 3 per cent of 
GDP and most of the gains came from cotton because the United States 
exported about 60 per cent of its production. India gained little from the 
exports of rice and wheat because it consumed 93 per cent and 86 per cent of 
the output. Over two thirds of gains in the long run came from cotton and jute. 
The total gains for Indonesia depends on the allocation of price changes for 
sugar and, as said, the results of the regression (and thus the lower estimates 
of gains) seem more plausible. Furthermore, as a net importer of rice, 
Indonesia lost from the rise in price of domestic rice but gained from the 
decline in price of imported (inferior) Indian rice. As Table 7 shows, the net 
effect was positive. 
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As a whole, gains from price convergence were substantial but not huge. 
Admittedly, we neglect general-equilibrium effects, which however can 
potentially bias our results in either direction (Brockmeier and Bektasoglu 
2014; Kokoski and Smith 1987; Narayanan et al. 2010). The size of this bias 
can be gleaned by comparing our results with available general-equilibrium 
estimates. According to the Computable General Equilibrium model by 
Williamson (1990: 136) the Corn Laws just before their abolition reduced 
British GDP by 1.5 per cent. As GDP grew four-folds between then and 1913, 
a straightforward comparison would imply that our (long-run) estimate is over 
twice as big. Taking into account the effect of transportation costs and the 
differences between 1841 and 1913, the order of magnitude of the two 
estimates is similar.14 Federico and Tena (2016b) estimate with the sufficient 
statistics by Arkolakis et al. (2012) that in 1913 imports increased GDP by 
1.41 per cent in the United States, by 2.26 per cent in Indonesia, by 2.31 per 
cent in India and by 9.08 per cent in the United Kingdom. This latter figure 
tallies well with our estimate taking into account that this refers about 20 per 
cent of British imports (Board of Trade 1913) and the different counterfactual 
(autarky for Arkokalis et al., finite trade costs for ours). The two sets of 
estimates are broadly consistent also for the producing countries, given the 
shares on total exports (Table 2) and Arkolakis et al.’s assumption of 
balanced trade. Thus, our model captures most of welfare gains: if anything, 
these comparisons suggests it overvalues the gains. 
                                                          
14
 In comparison to 1841, in 1913 the gap between production and consumption of wheat was 
larger (augmenting the gains ceteris paribus), but the share of wheat on consumption lower 
(reducing the gains).  
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It would be rash to extend our aggregate estimates to other countries and 
thus a fortiori to the whole world economy. We will rather perform a back of 
the envelope estimate of gains from integration of market of a key commodity, 
cotton, which accounted for about 5 per cent of world trade in 1913 (Federico 
and Tena 2016c). The United States and India accounted for 65 per cent and 
15 per cent of world export and Egypt for a further 13 per cent. The country 
exported almost nothing else (Panza 2013) – and thus we assume gains from 
integration to have accounted for 1 per cent of GDP (about twice than the 
Indian gains). From consumption side, we consider only Western Europe and 
Japan, omitting minor producers and we assume conservatively that gains 
from cotton imports amounted to 0.25 per cent of their GDP, a quarter of the 
British ones. With these parameters, the integration of the cotton market 
increased world GDP in 1913 by about a quarter of a percentage point. 
All these figures refer to nation-wide gains: how were they distributed among 
regions and between different social groups within regions? In general, the 
distribution of gains would be the more equitable the wider the production (or 
consumption) area and the more competitive the markets for factors and 
commercial services are. In Europe, most people benefitted of integration, as 
the whole populations consumed wheat, tropical goods and cotton 
manufactures, and the markets for their distribution were fairly competitive. In 
contrast, the production for export was often concentrated in a few areas, 
which consequently reaped most of the gains from integration. In the United 
States, in 1913 seven states, all in the South, produced each more than 5 per 
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cent of the whole cotton output, jointly accounting for 90 per cent of it.15 In the 
Dutch East Indies, two provinces accounted for 74 per cent of exports of tin, 
60 per cent of sugar and 45 per cent of pepper and coffee (Clemens et al. 
1992: Tables 3 and 4). Production was highly concentrated also in India. The 
share of the largest producing state ranged from a third for wheat, rice and 
cotton to almost nine tenths for jute (Bengal), and that of the two top states 
from a half for  cotton to 96 per cent (jute again). On the other hand, these 
pockets of specialization by product were scattered all over the subcontinent. 
In fact, eight states produced more than 5 per cent of the total output of the 
export crops of our sample, and the most important of them, Bengal, did not 
reach a quarter of the total. We compute the GDP by state as total Indian 
GDP times the share of each state on population from the 1911 Census 
(Statistical Abstract) and we estimate the gains.16 Over the whole period 
(’earliest to 1913’), they ranged from over 5 per cent in the Central Provinces 
to less than 0.2 per cent in Burma and Mysore. As implicit in Table 6, gains 
since 1870 were smaller, but the dispersion across provinces and the ranking 
were pretty similar, with a notable exception: Assam. It is close to the bottom 
according to the long run estimate (gains 0.4 per cent of GDP) and comes top 
in short-run one (3.9 per cent). This jump reflects the change in coverage, as 
tea, Assam’s main staple, is missing from the long-run analysis. 
                                                          
15
 The data are from the ATICS data-base (Federico and Sharp 2013). Wheat output was less 
concentrated: only 5 states (all in the West North Central) exceeded 5 per cent of production, 
with a total share 53 per cent. 
16
 By definition Pi/GDPi=Pi/PT*GDPT/GDPi*Pt/GDPT, where P is gross output of exportable 
goods and i and T refers respectively to the province and to British India 
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The evidence on the organization of local markets for exportable goods is 
very thin but, with two major exceptions, it does not suggest a very high level 
of market power. The United States have a solid reputation for being a 
competitive economy, even if the American wheat farmers complained bitterly 
of being squeezed by railways companies and middlemen (Persson and 
Sharp 2013). Yet obviously plantation owners rather than slaves had to enjoy 
most of the gains from the integration of the world cotton market in the pre-
civil war American South. Concentration of export of indigo from Bengal in 
1840-1842 was not high: there were, according to a source, 32 exporting 
houses, and the top six managed about two thirds of the total trade.17 
However, indigo was extracted from a root, and thus benefits could accrue to 
industrialists rather than to cultivators. Indeed Ray (2011) argues that the final 
demise of the Bengal indigo industry was accelerated by a change in 
legislation to favor owners of indigo workshops over peasants. Gupta (1997, 
2001, 2005) finds evidence of oligopolistic pricing in inter-war India in the 
British-dominated jute and tea industries, but collusion was unstable. The only 
well-documented instance of monopoly is the Dutch Cultivation System, set 
up in 1830 to extract revenues in kind from Indonesian peasant. The system 
worked very well: the losses amounted to about 6 per cent of GDP of Java, 
with peaks over 8 per cent in some years (Van Zanden and Marks 2012: 51). 
Most of these sums accrued to the Dutch government, and the rest to Dutch 
business. The transfers amounted to almost 4 per cent of the Dutch GDP in 
the 1850s, plus another 0.6 per cent for hidden subsidies to shipping (Van 
Zanden and Van Riel 2004: Table 5.1; GDP from Smits et al. 2000). However, 
                                                          
17 Personal communication by M. Aldous. 
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the system was slowly phased out, and since the early 1870s exports were 
totally free. 
Last but not least, all these computations refer to gains from international 
trade only and thus neglect the additional gains from domestic integration. 
Without barriers to trade to abolish, gains could be had only by cutting 
domestic transportation costs. This latter was small and gains consequently 
limited, for sea-borne trade. For instance, the freight factor for the transport of 
tin between the mines, in the islands of Bangka, to Batavia, never exceeded 2 
per cent over the whole period 1839 to 1928, declining about 1.5 per cent in 
the 1870s-1880s to 0.7-0.8 per cent in the interwar years (cf. Korthals Altes 
1994: Appendix A). In contrast, overland transportation costs fell dramatically. 
The freight factor for transport wheat from Chicago to New York by rail fell 
from over 50 per cent in the 1850s to about 10 per cent on the eve of World 
War One, to rebound in the interwar years as a consequence of rail regulation 
(Federico and Sharp 2013). For Donaldson and Hornbeck (2013) in the late 
nineteenth century the American railroads increased GDP by 3.40 per cent 
per year solely through their impact on land values. There is some evidence 
of convergence of rice prices also in Indonesia (van Zanden and Marks 2012: 
25-26) and price gaps in the 1920s were decidedly smaller than in India 
(Marks 2010). But in India, too, price gaps for rice and wheat shrank in the 
second half of the 19th century (Hurd 1975; Studer 2008; Andrabi and 
Kuehlwein 2010). Indeed, two recent estimates, with different methods, 
suggest quite high gains from railways in India on the eve of World War One – 
around 6 per cent according to Bogart et al. (2015), who relies on growth 
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accounting and about 16 per cent according to Donaldson (forthcoming), who 
uses a general equilibrium model. 
 
8) Conclusions 
 
  So far, historians and economists have assumed the effects of market 
integration during the first globalization to be positive and extensive, mostly on 
the basis of a purely theoretical reasoning. This paper is a first attempt to 
quantify them, comparing a success-story such as the Unites States with two 
large peripheral Asian countries with the same analytical framework. We have 
used a data-parsimonious and thus easily replicable model, buttressing the 
results with additional econometric testing. We find that: 
i) price convergence explains almost all the improvement in terms of trade in 
producing countries. If improvements in terms of trade on long-run economic 
growth were harmful as posited by Williamson (2011), the dynamic losses 
may compensate the static benefits of integration. 
ii) price convergence did foster large increases in bilateral trade, but for many 
products its effect was balanced or overwhelmed by other forces. The 
comparison between regression-based estimates with and without the (crude) 
estimates of multilateral resistance factor confirms that the latter were indeed 
a major determinant of bilateral trade (Anderson Van Wincoop 2004). 
iii) price convergence brought substantial (static) benefits to both producers 
and especially consumers but their size differed rather markedly across 
countries and time and, in all likelihood, also within producing countries. 
31 
 
31 
 
In a nutshell, our analysis suggests that trade costs were important for trade 
and welfare, but their effects fall short from the most extravagant expectation, 
cautioning against the substation of proxies to actual measures. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Percentages of products on total exports 
 
India Indonesia 
United 
States 
1810 26.4 84.0a 28.4 
1830 45.0b 67.1 47.0 
1850 40.5 76.3 55.0 
1870 55.5 73.3 59.5 
1890 57.1 59.4 34.5 
1900 46.5 56.4 25.3 
1913 53.3 43.4 27.2 
Notes: 
a
 1823, 
b 
1828 
Sources: India: Chaudhuri (1982), Indonesia: 
Korthals Altes (1991), United States: Historical 
Statistics (2006: series Ee 571 and 575). 
 
Table 2 
Shares on world exports (in percentage) 
 
India Indonesia Asia USA 
World 
(mil $ 
1913) 
1831 5.1 0.6 12.5 6.5 916 
1851 5.0 1.4 14.2 8.9 2045 
1870 5.4 0.9 12.5 7.9 4690 
1890 5.9 1.0 12.3 11.3 8901 
1900 4.0 1.1 11.0 14.4 11437 
1912 4.5 1.4 12.2 12.9 17688 
Source: Federico and Tena (2016a) 
Notes: The column ‘World’ is at constant (1913) prices, while the 
shares are computed on three-year moving averages with data 
at current prices. Trends of shares at 1913 prices are similar, but 
the decline of India is much steeper. 
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Table 4 
The changes in actual terms of trade 
 
1849-1913 
 
1849-94 
  India Indonesia USA Indonesia 
Total change 
    
Terms of trade 110 41 10 125 
Export prices (actual) 93 53 54 63 
Export prices (synthetic) 118 108 39 32 
     
Contribution (in percentage) 
    Export prices to terms of trade (C1) 110 92 292 82 
Synthetic export prices to total export prices (C2) 127 203 72 52 
Synthetic export prices to terms of trade (C1*C2) 140 187 210 42 
Sources: see text, Online Appendix C and Federico and Tena (2015a). 
Notes: total changes estimated with HP filters; the reference is 1849=100. 
 
Table 5 
The contribution of price convergence to the terms of trade (in percentage) 
 
1849-1913 1849-1894 
  India Indonesia USA Indonesia 
To changes in synthetic export price index (C3) 
 
 
Counterfactual 1 64 45 15 98 
Counterfactual 2  91 79 44 150 
Counterfactual 3 76 64 19 110 
To changes in terms of trade (C1* C2* C3) 
 
 
Counterfactual 1 89 85 31 41 
Counterfactual 2  128 148 92 63 
Counterfactual 3 107 119 40 46 
Sources: see text. 
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Table 7 
The welfare effect of price convergence (in percentage of GDP) 
 
 
Model 
 
Regression  
    Earliest to 1913  1870-1913  Earliest to 1913  1870-1913 
United Kingdom 2.054 0.571 2.147 0.764 
Wheat 0.989 0.351 0.773 0.336 
Cotton 0.823 0.046 0.858 0.081 
Other goods 0.242 0.173 0.516 0.346 
     
United States 0.228 0.007 0.208 0.008 
Wheat 0.008 0.002 0.018 0.011 
Cotton 0.220 0.005 0.190 0.019 
     
India 1.362 1.016 0.999 0.885 
Cereals 0.246 0.136 0.195 0.201 
Cotton 0.677 0.515 0.321 0.246 
Other goods 0.439 0.365 0.483 0.437 
     
Indonesia 2.166 1.550 0.594 0.579 
Rice (exports) 
 
-0.032 
 
-0.162 
Rice (imports)   0.455   0.318 
Other goods 2.166 1.127 0.594 0.442 
Sources: see text and Online Appendix C 
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Figures 
Figure 1 
Price ratios and fitted values, selected commodities 
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Figure 2 
Terms of trade (1913=100) 
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Sources: cf. Federico and Tena (2016a). 
 
Figure 3 
The growth of exports at constant prices (1913=100) 
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Source: Federico and Tena (2016a). 
41 
 
41 
 
Figure 4 
Welfare gains from integration, producing country 
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Appendix A: statistical appendix 
Table A1 
Shares of changes in trade costs for producing countries: regression analysis 
Constant 
    Good Origin Destination 
  Cotton India UK 3.712 *** 
Indigo India UK 5.832 *** 
Jute India UK 2.614 *** 
Linseed India UK 2.348 *** 
Rapeseed India UK 2.254 *** 
Rice India UK 1.950 *** 
Tea India UK 4.590 *** 
Wheat India UK 1.928 *** 
Coffee Indonesia Netherlands 4.360 *** 
Rice Indonesia Netherlands 1.739 *** 
Sugar Indonesia UK 2.471 *** 
Tin Indonesia Netherlands 5.071 *** 
Cotton Us UK 3.602 *** 
Wheat Us UK 2.235 *** 
     -Share 
    Good Origin Destination 
  Cotton India UK -0.209 *** 
Indigo India UK -0.381 *** 
Jute India UK -0.499 *** 
Linseed India UK -0.414 *** 
Rapeseed India UK -0.425 *** 
Rice India UK -0.281 *** 
Tea India UK -0.714 *** 
Wheat India UK -0.351 *** 
Coffee Indonesia Netherlands -0.642 *** 
Rice Indonesia Netherlands -0.371 *** 
Sugar Indonesia UK -0.151 *** 
Tin Indonesia Netherlands -0.720 *** 
Cotton US UK -0.270 *** 
Wheat US UK -0.387 *** 
     R-squared 
  
0.820 
 N     2358   
Notes: N=number of observations; ***=significant at the 1 per cent level; **=significant at the 5 
per cent level; *=significant at the 10 per cent level; standard errors clustered by trade flow. 
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Figure A1 
The price of Java sugar in Indonesia and in the UK (£/long ton) 
 
 
Table A2 
Elasticity of the synthetic price index with respect to price ratios: India, 1850-
1913 
C 4.592 *** 
LOG_INDIGO -0.097 ** 
LOG_JUTE -0.477 *** 
LOG_LINESEED -0.408 *** 
LOG_RAPESEED 0.089 
 LOG_P 0.229 ** 
AR(1) 0.929 *** 
   Adj. R-squared 0.921 
 N 62   
Notes: N=number of observations; ***=significant at the 1 per cent level; **=significant at the 
5 per cent level; *=significant at the 10 per cent level. 
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Table A3 
Elasticity of the synthetic price index with respect to price ratios: India, 1872-
1913 
C 2.744 *** 
LOG_COTTON -0.224 * 
LOG_INDIGO -0.250 *** 
LOG_JUTE -0.156 *** 
LOG_LINESEED 0.138 
 LOG_RAPESEED -0.052 
 LOG_RICE -0.077 
 LOG_WHEAT -0.183 ** 
LOG_P 0.317 *** 
AR(1) 0.885 *** 
   Adj. R-squared 0.911 
 N 42   
Notes: N=number of observations; ***=significant at the 1 per cent level; **=significant at the 
5 per cent level; *=significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
 
Table A4 
Elasticity of the synthetic price index with respect to price ratios: Indonesia, 
1850-1913 
C 2.956 *** 
LOG_COFFEE -0.516 *** 
LOG_PEPPER -0.014 
 LOG_RICE -0.024 
 LOG_SUGAR -0.405 *** 
LOG_P 0.446 *** 
AR(1) 0.860 *** 
   Adj. R-squared 0.875 
 N 64   
Notes: N=number of observations; ***=significant at the 1 per cent level; **=significant at the 
5 per cent level; *=significant at the 10 per cent level. 
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Table A5 
Elasticity of the synthetic price index with respect to price ratios: Indonesia, 
1872-1913 
C 3.0651 *** 
LOG_COFFEE -0.168 * 
LOG_PEPPER -0.359 * 
LOG_TIN -0.12 
 LOG_SUGAR -0.274 * 
LOG_P 0.3367 *** 
AR(1) 0.8716 *** 
   Adj. R-squared 0.842 
 N 42   
Notes: N=number of observations; ***=significant at the 1 per cent level; **=significant at the 
5 per cent level; *=significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Table A6 
Elasticity of the synthetic price index with respect to price ratios: United 
States, 1850-1913 
C 26.024 * 
LOG_COTTON -0.598 ** 
LOG_WHEAT -0.202 
 CIVIL WAR 0.303 ** 
YEAR -0.011 
 AR(1) 0.854 *** 
   Adj. R-squared 0.856 
 N 64   
Notes: N=number of observations; ***=significant at the 1 per cent level; **=significant at the 
5 per cent level; *=significant at the 10 per cent level. 
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Table A7 
Elasticity of the synthetic price index with respect to the market integration 
index, 1850-1913 
  India   Indonesia US   
       C 5.977 *** 6.472 *** 27.315 * 
LOG_MI -0.618 *** -0.770 *** -0.627 ** 
LOG_P 0.353 *** 0.369 *** 
  YEAR 
    
-0.010 
 CW 
    
0.401 *** 
AR(1) 0.927 *** 0.819 *** 0.851 *** 
       Adj. R-squared 0.859 
 
0.834 
 
0.837 
 N 64   64   64   
Notes: N=number of observations; ***=significant at the 1 per cent level; **=significant at the 
5 per cent level; *=significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Table A8 
Trade elasticity: IV panel regression analysis 
Constant 
    Good Origin Destination 
  Indigo India UK 30.371 * 
Jute India UK -39.872 *** 
Lineseed India UK -22.292 * 
Coffee Indonesia Netherlands 41.339 *** 
Rice Indonesia Netherlands -3.900 
 Sugar Indonesia UK -83.700 *** 
Cotton US UK -22.243 ** 
Wheat US UK -47.396 *** 
     Rate of change 
    Good Origin Destination 
  Indigo India UK -0.015 * 
Jute India UK 0.024 *** 
Lineseed India UK 0.015 ** 
Coffee Indonesia Netherlands -0.020 *** 
Rice Indonesia Netherlands 0.004 
 Sugar Indonesia UK 0.046 *** 
Cotton US UK 0.015 *** 
Wheat US UK 0.029 *** 
     Trade elasticity 
  
-1.813 *** 
     Dummies 
    Civil_war_cotton_US 
  
-2.278 *** 
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Table A8-cont     
Civil_war_wheat_US 
  
0.360 
 Synthetic_dye 
  
-1.333 *** 
     Exogeneity chi-square test 
 
4.761 ** 
Exogeneity F test 
  
4.608 ** 
First stage R-square 
  
0.981 
 N     509   
     Table A9 
The welfare effect of price convergence (in percentage of GDP) 
 
Model 
 
Regression  
 
  
 Earliest to 
1913 
 1870-1913 
 Earliest to 
1913 
 1870-1913 
United Kingdom 2.571 0.649 3.013 0.913 
Wheat 1.118 0.393 0.930 0.375 
Cotton 1.101 0.047 1.175 0.083 
Tea 
 
0.025 
 
0.027 
Indigo 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Jute 0.094 0.062 0.068 0.045 
Linseed 0.054 0.017 0.135 0.039 
Rapeseed 
 
0.007 
 
0.006 
Rice 0.087 0.039 0.051 0.029 
Coffee 0.006 0.002 0.012 0.004 
Sugar 0.108 0.056 0.640 0.305 
  
 
  
United States 0.260 0.010 0.263 0.015 
Wheat 0.025 0.005 0.062 0.011 
Cotton 0.235 0.005 0.202 0.004 
     
India 1.799 1.162 1.272 1.100 
Wheat 0.522 0.126 0.376 0.095 
Cotton 0.799 0.588 0.350 0.263 
Tea 
 
0.112 
 
0.109 
Indigo 0.019 0.001 0.026 0.001 
Jute 0.263 0.177 0.417 0.278 
Linseed 0.196 0.059 0.103 0.032 
Rapeseed 
 0.029  0.045 
Rice 
 0.070  0.276 
     
Indonesia 2.186 1.569 0.615 0.746 
Sugar 1.989 1.000 0.327 0.173 
Coffee 0.115 0.042 0.092 0.034 
Rice (exports) 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.020 
Rice (imports) 
 
0.455 
 
0.318 
Tin 0.082 0.101 0.197 0.242 
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Appendix B: The model with the ‘iceberg’ assumption 
 
Following the ‘iceberg assumption’ the price ratio between the producing and 
the consuming country, in efficient trading markets, is equal to one plus 
transaction costs, or t. Thus, we substitute PC=PPt and simplify notation by 
writing PP=P. By definition total demand equals total supply 
DC+DP = SC + SP 
 We start by substituting 1)-2) in the equation 
γAP+ γEPt= αPt + βP 
or 
P= Pt(α- γC)/(γP-β) 
Re-arranging yields an expression for the effect of changes in transaction 
costs on the prices of the producer 
dP/dt =dP/dt* t(α- γC)/(γP-β)+ P(α- γC)/(γP-β) 
or 
 dP = P(α- γC)/[γP-β-t(α- γC)]*dt A1) 
while the parallel condition for the change in prices of the consumer is:  
d(Pt)/dt= tdP/dt+P 
d(Pt) ={tP(α- γC)/[γP-β-t(α- γC)]+P}*dt A2) 
   We express the unknown coefficients α, β or γ in terms of elasticities of 
demand (ηC and ηP) and supply (εC and εP). To this aim, we select unit of 
measurement so that at time zero P=1 and SP=1. Furthermore we express 
European supply and Asian consumption as proportions z and x of Asian 
production (SC=zSP=z  and DP=xSP=x). Of course, for tropical products 
(including cotton) SC=z=0. In this notation, the consumer’s demand is equal to 
imports from the producer (XP) plus local supply DC= XP + SC =SP-DP+SC=(1-
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x+z). Substituting in the standard definition of elasticity and re-arranging, we 
obtain α=ηC(1-x+z)/t, β=ηP*x, γC = εC*z/t and γP= εP. We thus can re-write 5) 
and 6) as function of the elasticities and of the parameters x,t and z  
dP = [ηC(1-x+z)/t - εC*z/t)/[εP - ηP*x-ηC(1-x+z)+εC*z)]*dt A3) 
d(Pt) ={(ηC(1-x+z) - εC*z)/[εP - ηP*x-ηC(1-x+z)+εC*z)]+1}*dt    A4) 
 Substituting A3) and A4) in the identity dt=d(Pt)-tdP we allocate dt  
We can also estimate the effects of changes in transaction costs (dt) on trade 
(dXP) as the difference between changes in the consumer’s demand (dDC) 
and in its supply (dSC) 
dXP= αd(Pt) - γEd(Pt)= [ηC(1-x+z)/t-εC*z/t]*{P(ηC(1-x+z) - εC*z)/[(εP - ηP*x)-
(ηC(1-x+z)-εC*z)]+1}*dt    A5) 
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Appendix C: sources  
 
1. Elasticities 
The elasticities are drawn from an extensive survey of the literature, cross-
checking the different sources for consistency. We rely on estimates which 
match our products, period and areas as closely as possible and significant 
violations of our assumptions are unlikely. A close match in all three respects 
was possible for the European demand for wheat, cotton and jute, the 
American demand for cotton, the European and American supplies of wheat 
and the Indian and American supplies of cotton. While O’Rourke and 
Williamson (1994: 914), basing themselves on old estimates, assume that the 
elasticity of the UK’s demand for wheat in 1870-1913 was -0.3, a recent 
estimate by Barquin (2005: 264) for Europe in 1884-1913 implies a somewhat 
higher elasticity (-0.45). A correction in the same direction is also implied by 
the figure used by Allen (2000: 14) for the demand for agricultural products in 
pre-modern Europe (-0.6).  We therefore use -0.5.  The European elasticity of 
demand for cotton is based on the values estimated by Irwin (2003: 283) for 
Indian cotton in the UK in 1820-1859. The elasticity of the European demand 
for jute is estimated as -1, as done by the producers in India at the time 
(Chakrabarty, 2000: 43). The elasticity of demand for cotton in the US is 
based on Wright’s (1971: 119) estimate for the mid-nineteenth century. 
Turning to the supply elasticity of wheat, O’Rourke and Williamson (1994: 
119) justify a value of 1 by citing Harley (1986), who, in turn, cites Fisher and 
Temin (1970) for the US and Olson and Harris (1959) for the UK. Fisher and 
Temin (1970) offer estimates by US state for the period 1867-1914 and their 
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average is indeed very close to 1. However, after eliminating an obvious 
outlier (Iowa, where the figure is 10.76), the mean becomes 0.74. Olson and 
Harris’ (1959) estimate (greater than 1.6) would imply that the supply in the 
UK in 1873-1894 was much more elastic than in the US, which is hardly 
plausible. Ward’s (2004: 251) recent estimate for the UK 1864-1880 is 0.68, 
which is in line with expectations. The figure is also close to estimates 
reported by Askari and Cummings (1976) for the UK in the inter-war years 
(0.72) and the US in 1867-1914 (0.8). We therefore use 0.75 for the elasticity 
of the supply of wheat both in the UK and the US. Wright’s (1974: 617) 
estimates of the supply elasticity of Indian cotton in the mid-nineteenth 
century range from 0.32 and 0.75; the value of 0.5, which is also close to 
those found by Wright (1974: 617-618) for Brazil and Egypt at the same time 
and is chosen by Irwin (2003: 284), too, is used here. Estimates by Wright 
(1974) and Duffy et al. (1994) agree that the supply was more elastic in the 
mid-nineteenth century U.S., in the order of twice as much (Irwin, 2003: 286), 
justifying a value of 1 there. 
All the remaining elasticities of demand in Europe, but that of indigo, are 
based on recent estimates for Italy in 1870-1913 taken from Federico and 
Vasta (2014). Specifically we use their figures as follows (the name in 
parentheses refers to the group upon which our estimates are based): rice 
(cereals), tea, coffee and pepper (tea, coffee and spices), tin (metals), 
rapeseed and linseed (oil seeds).  Given that by the early twentieth century 
Germany produced synthetic substitutes for indigo, we assume that the 
demand for this specific product was comparatively elastic, both in India (-1) 
and especially in Europe (-1.5). Like O’Rourke and Williamson (1994), we 
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assume that the elasticity of demand for wheat in the US was the same as in 
the UK, where diet and incomes were very similar. For the Asian demand, 
there are pre-1914 estimates only for cotton and hardware. Desai’s (1971: 
353) estimate of the demand elasticity for cotton in India between 1814 and 
1904 (-0.80) is admittedly rough; nevertheless it is reassuringly close to Murti 
and Sastri’s (1951: 320) estimate for the inter-war years (-0.89). The elasticity 
is also close but somewhat higher to the value used for the UK (0.7), where it 
is reasonable to assume that income and climate made cotton relatively more 
necessary than in India. Murti and Sastri (1951: 320) also estimates that the 
elasticity of demand for hardware in inter-war India was close to -1; this vale is 
used for the demand elasticity of tin in the Dutch East Indies.  
For the remaining goods the Asian demand elasticities rely on measures 
made in present-day India. For Swamy and Bisanwager (1983: 681-682) 
Indian demand is more inelastic for wheat (-0.23 to -0.32) than for rice (-0.58 
to -0.70), which is odd. For Kumar et al. (2011: 11-12) for the very poor the 
demand elasticity for both wheat and rice is about -0.5, which matches those 
of the UK and the US before 1913; hence, we use this value for both wheat 
and rice in Asia. Kumar et al.’s (2011: 11-12) estimates for the very poor also 
suggest demand elasticities in Asia of -0.5 for rapeseed and lineseed (edible 
oils), -0.3 for sugar, and -1 for jute, tea, coffee and pepper (other food & non-
food).  These values imply equal or lower elasticities of demand for food in 
Asia than in Europe, which is consistent with inelastic demand for items of 
staple food in low-income economies with few available substitutes.  
For the Asian supply elasticities, we mainly rely on Askarin and Cummins 
(1976) and Krishna (1963: 485) who report pre- ‘green revolution’ figures for 
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rice, wheat, rape, cotton, jute, sugar and tea. Reassuringly the figures do not 
suggest major changes between the inter-war years and the post-1945 
period. Indeed for cotton they tend to be very close to the nineteenth-century 
estimates quoted earlier: discounting for an obvious outlier (American cotton 
in Punjab in 1900-19139 yields a figure of 9.74) the average (0.59) is very 
close to 0.5. In general, the production of agricultural commodities emerges 
as inelastic and the figures suggest that 0.5 is a reasonable approximation. 
For tin, too, we rely on present-day (1955-1975) estimates in Indonesia and 
other producing areas, which suggest that a value of 1 is appropriate 
(Chhabra et al., 1978: 13). Although mining technology obviously did change 
significantly since 1913, for Matthews (1990: 23) in the nineteenth-century, 
too, tin production was inelastic in the short-run, but more elastic in the long-
run. With the only exceptions of wheat, whose supply elasticity has already 
been discussed, and Indian cotton, which was mainly substituted by American 
cotton, for Europe, in all cases the main alternative sources were other 
tropical countries. Hence, the Asian supply elasticities are used for the 
European elasticities for all the remaining goods. As implied earlier, at least 
for cotton, that this assumption is reasonable is borne out by the data. By the 
same token, the American elasticity is used for Europe when examining 
Indian cotton. 
 
2. Quantitites 
Atlantic. Until 1853 the sources for cotton are: House of commons 
Parliamentary Papers (HPP) (1809: 1, 1848a:2, 1854a: 255). These report 
continuous imports in the UK from the US of ‘cotton wool’ in lb (0.4536 kg) 
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from 1806, but with a hole in 1809-1814. The sources for wheat are: HPP 
(1827a: 9, 1827b: 2-3, 1832: 2-5, 1843: 59, 64, 1844: 6, 1847a: 8, 1854a: 4). 
These report continuous imports in the UK from the US of ‘wheat’, ‘wheat 
meal and flour’ or ‘wheat and wheat flour’ in quarters since 1800. From 1854, 
our source is Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom of Foreign 
Countries and British Possessions (ASTUK), for both ‘raw cotton’ (in cwt, i.e.  
112 lb, or centals of 100 lb) and ‘wheat’ (in cwt). In both cases, the series of 
exports from the US to the UK are without holes. 
India. Continuous data on exports of Indian indigo into the UK in lb from 1785 
until 1857, with just one hole in 1813, can be found in HPP (1813, 1818, 1820, 
1821: 368-369, 1823: 6-7, 1827a: 15, 1827b: 2, 1828: 24, 1832: 19, 1833: 5-
18, 1836: 2, 1840: 42, 1847b: 10, 1848b: 3, 1850: 3, 1854b: 5, 1858: 5). 
Continuous data on exports of jute from Bengal (in cwt) between 1828/1829 to 
1872/73 can be found in HPP (1874: 63-65). Although the source usually 
does not specify the destination, the figures for the US and France are very 
small in comparison to the total, suggesting that the great bulk of these 
exports was destined to the UK. This is also confirmed by ASTUK data from 
1855 (cf. below). Continuous data on exports to the UK of linseed and 
flaxseed in quarters (416 lb) for 1844-1857 were found in HPP (1854c: 4-5, 
1858: 6). ASTUK reports continuous data on exports to the UK from 1855 
(unless otherwise specified) to 1913 for cotton (in cwt, data from Bombay 
starts in 1864), indigo (in cwt), jute (in cwt or long ton), linseed (in quarters or 
long tons, flax and linseed for 1855-1858, 1871 ff.), rapeseed (in quarters or 
long ton), rice (in cwt, data from Burma starts in 1871), tea (in lb) and wheat 
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(in cwt or quarter, the data starts in 1856, but becomes continuous from 
1871). 
Indonesia. De Bruijn Kops (1857: 132-137, 166-169, 186-190, 198-201) 
documents continuous exports of coffee and tin from Java and Madura to the 
Netherlands (in pikols of 67.7613 kg) for 1825 to 1856. The same source 
reports data on exports of sugar to the UK (also in pikols) for the same years, 
but with gaps from 1826 to 1832. Statistiek van den In-, Uit-en Doorvoer 
reports data on Dutch imports from the Dutch East Indies (in ponds of 1 kg) 
from 1846 for coffee, rice and tin; in our years the only gaps are found in 
1871, 1881, 1891, 1898, 1913. Continuous data on exports of rice from Java 
to the Netherlands (in 1000s tons) between 1827 and 1916 can be found also 
in Korthals Altes (1978). ASTUK reports data on imports of Java sugar into 
the UK (in cwt) from 1855, with gaps in 1864-1867 and 1902. 
 
3. Welfare analysis 
The parameter θ (Formulae 13 and 14) is the share of the i-th product on total 
GDP. The numerator should be the value added (VA), but all sources report 
the gross output, inclusive of expenditures. We thus estimate the VA by 
product by multiplying gross output by a country-specific ratio gross output/VA 
from Federico (2004). We estimate δ under the assumption that consumers 
buy raw materials (cotton, wheat etc.) separately from processing and selling 
services. Thus, we compute the consumption as gross output less net 
exports, which is equivalent to imports for goods not produced in the country 
(e.g. tea in the United Kingdom).  
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In all cases, we compute the welfare gains separately by product. We cover 
ten products for European consumers (coffee, cotton, indigo, jute, linseed, 
pepper, rice, sugar, tea and wheat), two for American producers, eight for 
Indian producers (cotton, indigo, jute, linseed, rapeseed, rice, tea and wheat) 
and four for Indonesian producers (coffee, rice, tin, sugar). For the United 
States, we obtain data on gross output of wheat and cotton from Strauss and 
Bean (1940, Tables 13 and 25) and on GDP, consumption and net exports 
from Carter et al. (2006, Tables Ca188, Cd1, Ee571 and Ee575). The ratio 
VA/output is 0.84. We get data on gross output of wheat in the United 
Kingdom, from Ojala (1952: 208-209) and we use a VA/GDP ratio of 0.66. 
Imports are from Annual Statement of Trade (1913); total consumption and 
GDP are from Feinstein (1972, Table T9). For India, we assume a VA/output 
0.95 and we take data on gross output by product and total GDP from 
Sivasubramonian (2000, Tables 3 (c) and 6.10), averaging two consecutive 
crop years and on value of trade from the Statistical Abstract of British India 
(1913 issue).18  
The Dutch Indies are an exception because the estimates of national 
accounts by van der Eng (1992, Table A4) divide total agricultural production 
in three categories, food crops, cash crops (from peasant farms) and estate 
crops. We assume that sugar and coffee accounted for 65 per cent and 10 
per cent respectively of the sum of cash and estate crops and rice 75 per cent 
of the output of food crops, with an output/VA ratio of 0.95. Likewise, we 
assume that tin accounted for half of mining output and that VA accounted for 
                                                          
18
 The source does not report data on trade in linseed. We assume exports accounted for 15 
per cent of gross output, as for rapeseed. 
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90 per cent of the value of production. Finally, we assume that tin and coffee 
were entirely exported, that domestic consumption of sugar was about 1 per 
cent of production and that imports supplied 10 per cent of rice consumption 
(van der Eng 1997: 182). 
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